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Abstract—We propose a distributed algorithm for multiagent
systems that aim to optimize a common objective when agents
differ in their estimates of the objective-relevant state of the
environment. Each agent keeps an estimate of the environment
and a model of the behavior of other agents. The model of
other agents’ behavior assumes agents choose their actions
randomly based on a stationary distribution determined by
the empirical frequencies of past actions. At each step, each
agent takes the action that maximizes its expectation of the
common objective computed with respect to its estimate of the
environment and its model of others. We propose a weighted
averaging rule with non-doubly stochastic weights for agents
to estimate the empirical frequency of past actions of all other
agents by exchanging their estimates with their neighbors over
a time-varying communication network. Under this averaging
rule, we show agents’ estimates converge to the actual empirical
frequencies fast enough. This implies convergence of actions to
a Nash equilibrium of the game with identical payoffs given
by the expectation of the common objective with respect to an
asymptotically agreed estimate of the state of the environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
A networked multiagent system consists of heterogeneous
agents that aspire to achieve a common objective by choosing
their individual actions in the absence of a central coordi-
nator. The common objective, which may represent a power
control problem in wireless communications [1], a distributed
estimation problem [2], or a task given to a team of robots
[3], depends on an unknown environment variable in addition
to the actions of all agents. Here, we present a distributed
algorithm for the scenario when agents disagree on their
estimate of the environment, and thus of the objective. In
such a setting unless agents wait or exchange information
for multiple rounds, they cannot be sure about what other
agents are optimizing. When information about the environ-
ment is streaming or the system is large-scale, waiting or
communicating for multiple rounds before taking an action
may be undesirable as it will incur long coordination delays.
Here we propose a distributed algorithm for such scenarios
where coordination delay is unreasonable. In the algorithm,
agents keep an estimate of the environment and a model of
how other agents’ take their actions. Then, each agent best-
responds, i.e., takes the action that maximizes its expectation
of the objective with respect to their estimate and model of
behavior. The model of other agents’ behavior assumes that
each agent selects its actions from a stationary distribution
given by the histogram of their past actions. This model
is based on the fictitious play (FP) algorithm [4], [5].
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However, in a large-scale system, agents cannot observe the
past actions of all the agents. Instead, here we consider a
decentralized update scheme based on weighted averaging
that allows agents to keep track of the histograms of all other
agents when the communication network is time-varying.
The proposed decentralized scheme generalizes prior work
on distributed FP [6], [7] to time-varying communication
networks. We provide convergence rate of the decentralized
weighted averaging updates to the true empirical frequencies
when the weights matrix is row stochastic (see Proposition
1). Here, we build on distributed optimization algorithms
that rely on reaching consensus fast enough [8], [9]. Unlike
these prior works, we do not impose the weights of the
averaging to be coordinated in order to satisfy a doubly
stochastic assumption. The intuition behind our result is that
each agent is stubborn when it comes to keeping track of its
own histogram of past actions, and other agents are following
the stubborn agent’s updates through information exchanges
with their peers. As long as the time-varying network is
connected over a union of past edges for some fixed finite-
time, the stubborn agents’ updates cascades down to the
follower agents.
Given the fast enough convergence of the estimates on
others’ empirical frequencies, and eventual agreement on
the state of the environment, the distributed FP algorithm
converges to the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game where
agents have identical payoffs computed by integrating the
common objective with respect to the consensus estimates
on the state of the environment. At an NE action profile,
all agents act optimal with respect to the actions of other
agents. Our convergence result relates to the literature on
NE seeking algorithms [10]–[13]. This work distinguishes
from these NE seeking algorithms by not making any struc-
tural assumptions on the objective function, and considering
unknown and time-varying payoffs due to evolving estimates
of the environment.
II. NETWORKED MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS WITH
UNCERTAINTY
A group of agents N = {1, . . . , n} aims to maximize
a common objective u(a, θ) that is a function of the joint
action profile of all agents a := [a1, . . . , an], and the state
of the environment θ by selecting their individual actions ai
belonging to a finite action space Ai. We define the space
of joint action profile as A =
∏
i∈N Ai. The state of the
environment θ is unknown. At subsequent points in time
t = 0, 1, . . ., agents simultaneously decide on an action
ai(t) ∈ Ai that they deem optimal with respect to their
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current belief about the environment µi(t). Agent i’s belief
about the environment µi(t) assigns probabilities to possible
states of the environment Θ, i.e., it belongs to the space of
probability distributions over Θ, denoted with ∆(Θ).
If agents have different beliefs about the environment that
is unknown to agent i, agent i cannot be sure of the actions
of other agents a−i(t) := {aj(t)}j∈N\i, hence it cannot be
sure whether its action ai(t) ∈ Ai is optimal or not. In such a
scenario, we assume agent i keeps a belief about the choices
of other agents vi−i(t) := {vij(t)}j 6=i where vij(t) ∈ ∆(Aj) is
the belief of agent i on agent j’s next action. Using its beliefs,
agent i takes the action that maximizes the expectation of the
common objective computed with respect to its beliefs about
the state and the actions of other agents,
ai(t) ∈ argmax
ai∈Ai
u(ai, v
i
−i(t);µi(t)) (1)
where u(ai, vi−i(t);µi(t)) is the expectation of the objective
with respect to the beliefs vi−i(t) and µi(t).
A. Communication
Agents update their beliefs about the actions of other
agents, vi−i(t), by interacting with a subset of the agents
in N . The subset of the agents that i can interact with at
time t is determined by a network G(t) with node set N and
a symmetric edge set E(t). If the edge (i, j) belongs to E(t),
agents i and j can exchange information with each other
after decision epoch t. We denote the set of neighboring
agents that interacts with i at time t as N (i, t) := {j :
(i, j) ∈ E(t)}. We make the following assumption on the
connectivity of time-varying networks.
Assumption 1 The graph (N , E(∞)) is connected where
(i, j) ∈ E(∞) communicate infinitely many times, i.e.,
E(∞) = {(i, j)|(i, j) ∈ E(t) for infinitely many t} [9].
Assumption 2 There exist an integer T ≥ 1 such that for
every (i, j) ∈ E(∞) and k ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ E(k) ∪ E(k + 1) ∪
... ∪ E(k + T − 1). [9].
The Assumptions 1 and 2 made above are called connec-
tivity and Bounded intercommunication interval, respectively
in [9]. Together connectivity and bounded intercommuni-
cation interval imply that the information generated agent
j ∈ N can reach agent i ∈ N by some time.
Remark 1 Define the network G(t, T ) := (N , E(t, T ))
where E(t, T ) := ∪T−1τ=0 E(t + τ) for t > T where t, T ∈
N+. According to Assumption 1 and 2 G(t, T ) is strongly
connected for each t.
B. Information Exchange and Belief Updates
Agent i assumes other agents are selecting their actions
according to a stationary distribution, the empirical histogram
of their past actions. The empirical histogram of agent i at
time t, denoted by fi(t), can be recursively updated as [14]
fi(t+ 1) = fi(t) +
1
t
(Ψ(ai(t))− fi(t)), (2)
where, fi(t) denotes the empirical histogram of agent i at
time t, and Ψ(ai(t)) denotes an |Ai| × 1 dimensional vector
that is one at the kth element if ai(t) = k with k ∈ Ai, and
otherwise it is zero.
Agent i cannot observe past actions of all the agents given
the communication limitations. Hence, it is not possible for
agent i to keep track of the empirical histogram of other
agents. Instead, agent i will share and keep estimates of
others’ empirical frequencies in vi−i(t). Specifically, at each
step agent i receives its current neighbors’ estimates of agent
j’s empirical frequency {vkj (t)}k∈N (i,t)⋃{i} to update its
estimate as follows,
vij(t+ 1) =
∑
k∈N
wij,k(t)v
k
j (t), (3)
where wij,k(t) denotes the weight that agent i puts on k’s
estimate of agent j at time t. We make the following
assumptions on the weights.
Assumption 3 Assume there exists a scalar 0 < η < 1 such
that for all i ∈ N , and j ∈ N ,
(i) wij,k(t) ≥ η only if k ∈ N (i, t)
⋃{i}, otherwise wij,k(t) =
0.
(ii) wii,i(t) = 1 for all t.
(iii)
∑
k∈N w
i
j,k(t) = 1 for all t.
We define the weights matrix Wj(t) used for estimating
agent j’s empirical frequency at time t, where element in the
ith row and kth column of Wj(t) is [Wj(t)]i,k = wij,k(t), to
discuss the implications of the above assumptions. Assump-
tion 3(i) makes sure that agents can only put positive weights
on their current neighbors’ estimates in (3). Assumption 3(ii)
means that agent i only listens to itself (stubborn) when
its empirical frequency is of concern, that is, we assume
vii(t) = fi(t). This implies that jth row of Wj(t) is given
by eTj which is an 1× n row-vector of all zeros except 1 in
the jth element. Assumption 3(ii) also means that the weights
matrix Wj(t) is different for each agent j. Assumption 3(iii)
means that Wj(t) is row-stochastic for all times. Note that
we do not require Wj(t) to be doubly-stochastic. In time-
varying networks, requiring Wj(t) to be column stochastic is
unrealistic because it would necessitate agents to coordinate
their weights at each step.
We will be agnostic to the individual updates on the state
of the environment µi(t) as long as the state learning process
satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 4 The local beliefs on the state µi(t) converge
to a common belief µ ∈ ∆(Θ) in terms of total variation,
lim
t→∞TV(µi(t), µ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N , (4)
where the total variation distance between distributions µi(t)
and µ is defined as the maximum absolute difference between
the respective probabilities assigned to elements B of the
Borel set B(Θ) of the space Θ, i.e., TV(µi(t), µ) :=
supB∈B(Θ) |µi(t)(B)− µ(B)|.
This assumption is equivalent to the one made in [6]. Next,
we summarize the algorithm.
C. Decentralized Fictitious Play (D-FP) Algorithm
Algorithm 1 (D-FP algorithm)
Initialize
(i) For each i, let ai(0) be chosen arbitrarily, and let the
estimate vij(1) be initialized as fj(1) = Ψ(aj(1)) for all
j ∈ N \ i. Let µi(t) ∈ ∆(Θ) be arbitrarily chosen.
Iterate (t ≥ 1)
(ii) Agents simultaneously choose their next-stage action
according to the rule in (1).
(iii) Agents update their empirical frequencies fi(t) as in (2),
and let vii(t) = fi(t).
(iv) Each player i engages in one round of information
exchange with neighboring agents j ∈ N (i, t) where they
receive vj(t) := [fj(t), v
j
−j(t)] and updates their estimate of
the joint empirical distribution vi−i(t) according to (3).
(v) Agents update their beliefs about the environment µi(t)
according to some state learning process.
Step (ii) determines the actions, and steps (iii-v) determine
how agents update their beliefs vi−i(t) and µi(t). We assume
that agents synchronously select their actions, and update
their beliefs. However, the time-varying connectivity loosens
this assumption to scenarios where some agents randomly
wake up and send their beliefs to each other.
III. CONVERGENCE
We define the best individual action given the actions
of others as the Nash equilibrium (NE) action profile—
see Section III-A for a definition. We show convergence
of the empirical frequencies of actions fi(t) generated by
the D-FP algorithm converge to an NE (Theorem 1). The
key technical contribution is in showing the convergence of
beliefs vij(t) to true empirical frequency fj(t) with updates
(3) at a fast enough rate given non-doubly stochastic weights
(Proposition 1). Given this convergence rate, the convergence
to NE follows by results in [6]. Next, we introduce some
preliminary technical concepts.
A. Preliminaries: Game Theory
When the expectations of the objective are different, agents
N are playing a game Γ with utility functions ui,t(·) : A→
R, that is, Γ = {N , A, {ui,t}i∈N }. A mixed strategy σi in a
game corresponds to probability distribution over the action
space ∆(Ai). We use σi(ai) to denote the probability that
agent i takes action ai ∈ Ai. The joint mixed strategy profile
is the product distribution of individual mixed strategies
σ := {σ1, σ2, ..., σn}. We express the expected objective
value with respect to the strategy profile σ as
u(σ, θ) =
∑
a∈A
u(a, θ)σ(a) (5)
where A :=
∏
i∈N Ai. We define agent i’s expectation
of the common objective given its belief µi(t) about the
environment as follows,
ui,t(σ) := u(σ;µi(t)) =
∫
θ∈Θ
u(σ, θ)µi(t)(θ) (6)
A (mixed) strategy profile σ∗ ∈ ∏i∈N ∆(Ai) is a Nash
equilibrium of Γ if no agent has unilaterally profitable
deviation,
ui,t(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i) ≥ ui,t(σi, σ∗−i) ∀σi ∈ ∆(Ai). (7)
B. Convergence of Beliefs on Empirical Frequencies
Denote the vector that shows the estimation of the popu-
lation on the frequency of agent n’s lth action as x(t) :=
[[v1n(t)]l, . . . , [v
n
n(t)]l]
T ∈ Rn×1, where the kth element
of the vector is denoted by xk(t) = [vkn(t)]l. Recall that
[vnn(t)]l = [fn(t)]l by Assumption 3(ii). Thus xn(t) is
updated according to the dynamics in (2). Given the belief
updates in (3), we can write the linear dynamics for x(t) as
x(t+ 1) = W (t)
(
x(t) + (xn(t+ 1)− xn(t))en
)
(8)
where W (t) is the weights matrix for agent n defined after
Assumption 3 with subindex n dropped, and en is the n’s
vector of the canonical basis in Rn. The following result
shows convergence rate of beliefs in (8) to true empirical
frequency fn(t).
Proposition 1 Let x(t) ∈ Rn×1 be a belief vector evolving
according to (8) and the weights matrix W (t) satisfying
Assumption 3. If the communication network satisfies As-
sumptions 1 and 2, and xi(0) = xn(0), then ||xi(t) −
xn(t)|| = O( log tt ) for all i ∈ N \ n.
Proof: Define y(t) := x(t) − xn(t)1 where 1 is a column
vector of all ones. By subtracting xn(t)1 from both sides of
(8), we get
y(t+ 1) = W (t)(y(t) + δ(t)), (9)
where δ(t) := (xn(t + 1) − xn(t))(en − 1). Substituting
previous values of y(s) for s = 0, . . . , t in (9), we have
y(t+ 1) =
t−1∑
s=0
( s∏
τ=0
W (t− τ))δ(t− s). (10)
where we used the assumption xi(0) = xn(0) to get rid of
the initial term containing y(0). We take norms of both sides
and bound the left hand side by moving the norm inside the
summation
||y(t+ 1)|| ≤
t−1∑
s=0
||( s∏
τ=0
W (t− τ))δ(t− s)||. (11)
Lemma 1 states that the products of weight matrices converge
to 1eTn with some rate ρ. Thus we can bound the right hand
side above as follows,
||y(t+ 1)|| ≤
t−1∑
s=0
ρs||δ(t− s)||. (12)
Note that δ(t) ≤ n/t. Defining δavg(t) := 1t
∑t
s=1
n+1
s ,
we can conclude ||y(t + 1)|| ≤ δavg(t)ρ1−ρ . Result follows by
noting that δavg(t) = O( logtt ).
The result shows that agents are able successfully track
estimates of an arbitrarily selected agent n. When agents
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Fig. 1: (Left) Convergence of estimates∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N ||vˆij(t) − fj(t)|| (Right) Convergence of
empirical frequencies to NE (
∑
i∈N ||fi(t) − σ∗||) where
σ∗ is an NE strategy.
are able correctly estimate the empirical frequencies of other
agents, the algorithm is close to a centralized FP algorithm
from which convergence to NE follows as we state next.
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold. Define the
game with common state belief µ and identical payoffs ui,∞
as Γ(µ). The empirical frequency of actions generated by
Algorithm 1 converge to a NE strategy of Γ(µ),
lim
t→∞ minσ∗∈K(µ)
‖ft − σ∗‖ = 0 (13)
where K(µ) represents the set of Nash equilibria of Γ(µ),
i.e., all σ∗ that satisfy (7).
Proof of the above result follows by first observing that
Γ(µ) is an identical interest potential game [14]. Second, we
observe that Proposition 1 satisfies the same convergence
rate as its counterpart (Lemma 1) in [6] for fixed connected
communication networks. Thus the proof of Theorem 1
follows verbatim the proof of Theorem 1 in [6].
IV. SIMULATION
n = 5 agents are tasked with covering n targets. The
global objective is given as
u(a, θ) =
n∑
i=1
1
(∑
j 6=i
1(aj = k) = 0
)
||xi − θk||−2 (14)
where xi and θk are the locations of the agent i and target k,
respectively. As per (14), agents receive a zero payoff from a
target if more than one agent is covering it. The payoff agent
i can receive from selecting a target is inversely proportional
to its distance to the target. Target locations are unknown.
Agents receive private noisy signals about target locations at
each step. In the target assignment game with common utility
function in (14) and common beliefs on the state, there are
multiple Nash equilibria. In particular, any action profile that
covers all targets is a NE.
Fig. 1 compares convergence rates for fixed and time-
varying communication networks (ring and star). In the time-
varying networks each edge in the star (or ring) network
appears one at a time similar to gossiping schemes satisfying
Assumption 1 for T = 5. Fig. 1(Left) shows that total error
on estimates of empirical frequencies converges at the same
rate when the network is time-varying as when the network is
fixed. This plot confirms O( log tt ) rate shown in Proposition
1. Fig. 1(Right) shows the rate of convergence to a NE
action profile σ∗ for the run considered. While convergence
of empirical frequencies to σ∗ is as shown, agents start acting
according to the NE action profile σ∗, i.e., each agent selects
a different target, after t = 50 and t = 57 for time-varying
star and ring networks, respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a variant of the distributed
fictitious play for time-varying communication networks.
In the algorithm, agents keep estimates of empirical fre-
quency of others’ actions by sharing their estimates with
their current neighbors and updating their estimates using
weighted averaging. We showed that convergence rate of
the estimates are fast enough to guarantee convergence of
the empirical frequencies of actions to an NE of the game,
where eventually agents have identical expectations of the
common objective. The key technical novelty is that the
weights matrix is only row (non-doubly) stochastic which
means that there is no need for coordination of weights.
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APPENDIX
Define Φ(t, s) := W (t)W (t − 1) · · · W (s) for s ≤ t
where W (t) is the weights matrix in (8) for keeping track
of agent n’s empirical frequency. We overload notation to
define W (t, k) := Φ(t+ kT − 1, t+ (k− 1)T ) for k ∈ N+.
Note that the sparsity of W (t, k) corresponds to a strongly
connected network as per Assumptions 1 and 2. W (t, 1 :
d) := W (t, d)W (t, d−1) · · ·W (t, 1). For an arbitrary matrix
W , we denote its element in the ith row and jth column with
[W ]i,j . The matrix with nth column and nth row removed
is denoted with [W ]1:n−1,1:n−1.
Lemma 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then we have
(a) limt→∞Φ(t, s) = 1eTn for any s ∈ N+.
(b) |[Φ(t, s)]i,j − [en]j | ≤ κρt−s for some 0 < ρ < 1 and
κ > 0.
Proof: Let t = l + kT − 1 for given k, s ∈ N+ with l > s.
we can write
φ(l + kT − 1, s) = φ(l + kT − 1, l) · φ(l − 1, s).
Thus we can write
φ(l + kT − 1, s) = [
k∏
r=1
W (l, r)] · φ(l − 1, s). (15)
Let d = (n − 1)T . By Lemma 3, putting s value to be
l+md+1 the last column of the matrix product W (l,md+1 :
(m + 1)d) for every m is a positive vector. Let k = md in
(15), then we have
φ(l +mdT − 1, s) = [
md∏
r=1
W (l, r)] · φ(l − 1, s) (16)
= W (l, 1 : md) · φ(l − 1, s).
For l > s, φ(l−1, s) is row stochastic and [φ(l−1, s)]n,1:n =
eTn . All columns of φ(l−1, s) except for n-th column satisfy
condition of x0 and W (l, rd+1 : (r+1)d) satisfy condition
for matrix Dr for each r in Lemma 4, then
[W (l,1 : md) · φ(l − 1, s)]i,j 6=n
≤(1− η(n−1)T )m||φ(l − 1, s)]1:n,j 6=n||∞. (17)
Since ||φ(l − 1, s)]1:n,j 6=n||∞ ≤ 1 we have
[φ(l +mdT − 1, s)]i,j 6=n ≤ (1− η(n−1)T )m. ∀t > s (18)
Considering l +mdT − 1 = t and s ≤ l − 1 < s+ dT , we
have s+mdT ≤ t < (m+ 1)dT . As a result, we can write
(1− η(n−1)T )m = (1− η
(n−1)T )m+1
(1− η(n−1)T ) (19)
=
(1− η(n−1)T ) s+(m+1)dT−sdT
(1− η(n−1)T ) (20)
≤ (1− η
(n−1)T )
t−s
dT
(1− η(n−1)T ) . (21)
Thus, for every t, s with t ≥ s we can write
|[φ(t, s)]i,j 6=n − 0| ≤ κ
n− 1ρ
t−s (22)
where κ = (n−1)
(1−η(n−1)T ) and ρ = (1 − η(n−1)T )
1
dT . Because
the matrix Φ(t, s) is row stochastic, |[φ(t, s)]i,n − 1| ≤
κρt−s. Parts (a) and (b) follow from above.
The proof above follows similar steps as in Lemmas 1-
4 in [9]. The difference here is that we show the limiting
matrix is a specific rank one row-stochastic matrix, i.e., 1eTn
while in [9] it is shown that the limiting matrix is 1ξ(t)T
where ξ(t) is a stochastic vector. The key difference that
leads convergence to the specific stochastic vector is that
agent n only puts weight on itself (Assumption 3(ii)) while in
[9] this assumption is not made. Note that Assumptions 3(i)
and (iii) is equivalent to Assumption 1 in [9]. In a sense agent
n is stubborn when it comes to its own empirical frequency
which leads to other agents following agent n’s updates.
A. Technical Results
Lemma 2 Let weight rule of assumption 3(i) holds true then
(a) [φ(t, s)]j,j ≥ ηt−s+1 for all j, t, s, with t ≥ s
(b) [φ(t, s)]i,j ≥ ηt−s+1 for all t, s with t ≥ s for all i 6= n
and j, where (i, j) ∈ E(s) ∪ E(s+ 1) ∪ ... ∪ E(t).
(c) Let i 6= n and v 6= n, (i, v) ∈ E(s)∪E(s+ 1)∪ ...∪E(r)
for some r ≥ s and (v, j) ∈ E(r+ 1)∪ E(r+ 2)∪ ...∪ E(t)
for t > r. Then [φ(t, s)]i,j ≥ ηt−s+1.
(d) φ(t, s) for each t, s with t ≥ s is row stochastic.
Proof: The proof is similar to proof of lemma 1 of [9].
Lemma 3 Let Assumption 1, 2, and 3, hold. For all s, i 6= n
we then have [φ(s+ (n− 1)T − 1, s)]i,n ≥ η(n−1)T .
Proof: The proof is similar to proof of lemma 2 of [9] using
lemma 2 of this paper instead of lemma 1 of [9]. The main
difference is that we only consider paths that end at n to
make a claim about the last column of product.
Lemma 4 Let x0 be a column vector of size n such that
[x0]n = 0 and [x0]i is arbitrary for i 6= n. Let Dk for every
k be squared row stochastic matrix of size n where its last
column is a positive vector with elements greater than or
equal to some ζ and [Dk]n = eTn . Then if xk+1 = Dk · xk
for every k, we have
[xk+1]i ≤ (1− ζ)k||x0||∞ ∀i 6= n (23)
Proof: We know [xk+1]n = [Dk]n · xk = 0. Hence
[xk+1]i = [Dk]i · xk =
n−1∑
j=1
[Dk]i,j [xk]j + 0. (24)
Since Dk is row stochastic, we have
∑n−1
j=1 [Dk]i,j = 1 −
[Dk]i,n ≤ 1− ζ. Thus
[xk+1]i ≤ (1− ζ) · ||xk||∞ ∀i 6= n (25)
As a result
[xk+1]i ≤ (1− ζ)k · ||x0||∞ ∀i 6= n (26)
